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Abstract—Web applications are permanently being exposed to
attacks that exploit their vulnerabilities. In this work we investi-
gate the application of machine learning techniques to leverage
Web Application Firewall (WAF), a technology that is used to
detect and prevent attacks. We propose a combined approach of
machine learning models, based on one-class classification and n-
gram analysis, to enhance the detection and accuracy capabilities
of MODSECURITY, an open source and widely used WAF.
The results are promising and outperform MODSECURITY
when configured with the OWASP Core Rule Set, the baseline
configuration setting of a widely deployed, rule-based WAF tech-
nology. The proposed solution, combining both approaches, allow
us to deploy a WAF when no training data for the application
is available (using one-class classification), and an improved one
using n-grams when training data is available.
Index Terms—Web Application Firewalls, Machine Learning,
Anomaly Detection, One-class Classification, n-grams
I. INTRODUCTION
A web application is a piece of software, based on a
client-server architecture, that embodies a coordinated set of
functions. The information flowing between the client, which
runs on the user’s web browser, and the application server is
transmitted using the HTTP protocol.
By its very nature web applications are designed to be
exposed, therefore they are available to any individual, or
artifact, with capabilities to access the Internet. Thus, web
applications are a primary target for any attacker who wants
to unauthorizedly access the information they handle or to
place baits (e.g., fake URLs to his own site) to lure honest
users. It is quite usual for the code of a web application to
contain vulnerabilities like the ones listed and described in the
OWASP TOP 10 [1]. The work reported in this paper focuses
on preventing the abuse of web applications.
A Web Application Firewall (WAF) is a piece of software
that intercepts and inspects all the traffic between the web
server and its clients, searching for attacks inside the HTTP
packet contents. Once recognized, the suspicious packets may
This research was partially funded by ICT4V (https://www.ict4v.org). The
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be processed in a different, secure way, for instance being
logged, suppressed or derived to a honeypot application.
MODSECURITY [2] is an open source, widely used WAF
enabling real-time web application monitoring, logging and
access control. The actions MODSECURITY undertakes are
driven by rules that specify, by means of regular expressions,
the contents of the HTTP packets to be spotted. MODSE-
CURITY offers a default set of rules, known as the OWASP
Core Rule Set (OWASP CRS) [3], for tackling the most usual
vulnerabilities included in [1]. However, an approach only
based on rules also has some drawbacks: rules are static and
rigid by nature, so the OWASP CRS usually produces a rather
high rate of false positives, which in some cases may be
close to 40% [4]. Rule tuning is a time consuming and error
prone task that has to be manually performed for each specific
web application. In traditional networks firewalls and IDS, the
approach based on rules has been successfully complemented
with other machine learning-based tools, anomaly detection
and other statistical approaches which provide higher levels of
flexibility and adaptability. Those approaches take advantage
of sample data, from which the normal behavior of the
web application can be learned, in order to spot suspicious
situations which fall out of this nominal use (anomalies),
and which could correspond to on-going attacks. Our final
objective is to improve MODSECURITY with such anomaly
detection techniques.
The design of a statistically-based WAF may be built ap-
plying the knowledge that a security expert has on both the
application itself and the current state of the art on attack
techniques. Alternatively, a description of the expected normal
behavior of the web application may be built from legitimate
users’ input. In the first approach the WAF is trained to
recognize payloads that are instances of known attacks and
any input which cannot be recognized as an attack is deemed
to be a valid input. The second approach adopts the symmetric
point of view: the WAF learns the expected inputs of the web
application and any other bias from the expected values is
deemed as a potential attack. As we shall show in what follows
both approaches can be composed to recognize a broader class
of web application attacks.
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2Organization of the paper: The structure of the rest
of the paper is as follows: Section II provides some back-
ground and describes the approach we have taken to enhance
MODSECURITY virtual patching capabilities with machine-
learning techniques. Section III presents the two complemen-
tary learning models that we use to ground a statistical WAF.
Then, in Section IV we describe and discuss the outcomes
of the experiments we have performed. Section V reviews
related work. Further work and conclusions are presented in
Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Web application security and virtual patching
Usually, successful attacks result from exploiting vulner-
abilities present in the web application. The inspection and
fixing of the application’s code, however, might not always
be feasible. Critical applications, for instance, can not be off-
line until the bug has been fixed. Moreover, it might well
be the case that the source code of the application is neither
accessible nor longer available or patchable. We are interested
in the use of security virtual patching as a remediation
technique. In particular, we seek to enhance the functioning of
the widely deployed WAF called MODSECURITY. This virtual
patcher can be used to protect any web application and its
working relies on standardized and public protocols such as
HTTP.
Traditional network firewalls are designed to perform packet
inspection at the network level. Web applications, however,
exchange messages in higher layers, mostly HTTP, that tradi-
tional firewalls are not designed to understand. MODSECU-
RITY has been specifically designed to protect web applica-
tions with the ability to detect and identify patterns that could
result in an attack against the application. It is able to intercept
a broad class of attacks, including, among others, XSS (cross-
site scripting), any form of code injection and path traversal.
MODSECURITY has two modes of operation: detection and
prevention. In the first mode, records are generated for each
detected potential attack and used to monitor specific rules.
Normally, this mode is used in what is called learning phase.
The second mode is when the WAF is really useful: by
correctly configuring rules and directives it is able to block
potential malicious Web traffic. The core of MODSECURITY
implements a rule engine which can be set to execute in each
transaction of the application.
The use of MODSECURITY provides a first line of defense
against attacks and allows the detection of security problems
using a rule-based system. In other words, it is capable of
enforcing a negative security policy by blacklisting requests
that are filtered by those rules. This frequently results in the
generation of false alarms and requires a continuous update
of those rules. Failure to do so may result in limited or no
protection against new (zero-day) attacks and the generation
of too many false positives, which must be adjusted by adding
exceptions to the rules for each application. These adjustments
are strictly necessary in order to set to work the firewall,
otherwise the number of false positives generated can be so
high that basically results in a denial of service. However, the
management of rule configurations for MODSECURITY is a
complex and error-prone task. In particular, the writing and
maintenance of these configurations requires mastering a low
level language with an intricate syntax in which the modeling
of complex attacks involves several rules possibly residing in
multiple configuration files.
B. Learning attack detection
MODSECURITY is usually configured to work using a neg-
ative security policy because defining the rules that describe
normal behavior of the application to protect is an almost
impossible task in real life. The problem with this operational
mode is the high amount of false positives generated and the
amount of work needed during the learning phase. The main
objective of the research reported here is to enhance MOD-
SECURITY operation by using machine learning techniques to
adapt its behavior to that of the application that is protecting.
Depending on the operational context of the target application
one may consider alternative learning scenarios.
The problem of protecting a web application can be ad-
dressed using two different automated learning approaches: as
a classification problem and as an anomaly detection problem.
In the first approach protection of the application amounts
to classify a new given input using a model that has been
constructed from a previous training phase based on supervised
learning and using a collection of inputs, each one labeled
either as a valid input or as some kind of attack from an attack
taxonomy. However, the ideal situation of having available a
labeled dataset of application requests that represent valid and
attack behavior of a specific application is not always possible.
The second approach focuses on characterizing which are
the expected (valid) input values for the web application
considering any anomalous input supplied to the application
as a potential attack. Protecting the application therefore is
equivalent to outlier detection from a training dataset of valid
inputs.
The anomaly detection approach has several advantages.
First, as any behavior different from the usual one is con-
sidered problematic, it can potentially make it possible to
detect zero-days attacks. Additionally, training the WAF only
requires a collection of HTTP requests produced by friendly
users and no need for labelling the HTTP requests. However,
as noticed in [5], this approach cannot provide an answer to
all possible attack scenarios. This is because some of the web
application input data may be random data by its very nature.
Consider for instance a web application parameter carrying a
user password. It can be made of any combination of symbols,
and in principle all combination should be equally likely. In
such cases there is no hope to find a strong language signature
for the field, nor to reject a chosen password on the basis that
it is not frequently used. Furthermore, for security reasons, it
would not be advisable for the WAF to store information about
the distribution of such sensible parameters. In those cases,
where there is no a priori expected behavior, it is necessary to
adopt a symmetric approach, and search for attack signatures
in the field according to the current state of the art. This
amounts to search for carefully selected tokens which have
3been extracted from a labeled training dataset and representing
the knowledge of the security expert on the current attack
vectors. This technique deems the HTTP request as valid by
default when it cannot be recognized as an attack according
to the previous training.
C. Improving MODSECURITY detection capabilities
We have been experimenting with different learning tech-
niques to enhance the detection and accuracy capabilities of
MODSECURITY. We have pursued a combined approach that
we now proceed to explain.
First, we have experimented with a mechanism that inte-
grates one-class classification and MODSECURITY configured
using the OWASP CRS rules out of the box. This basically
combines two experts with the objective of classifying a
request. When both experts agree (both say valid or both
say attack) then the result is straightforward. In the case the
one-class approach classifies a request as an attack, given
that the OWASP CRS rules have the know-how on attacks,
we prioritize its answer (so if MODSECURITY classifies the
request as valid then is valid). This integration decision also
allows us to have a well known mechanism to train our WAF
in the case we found a false positive. Basically we need to tell
MODSECURITY rules that this request is not an attack. This
training mechanism is exactly the same as the one used with
the OWASP CRS nowadays. Finally, in the case that one-class
classifies the request as valid and MODSECURITY as an attack
we prioritize one-class since OWASP CRS is known to have
high false positive rates. This approach has shown to adapt
quite well to the scenario where there is not available a specific
training dataset for the application. We train the one-class
classifier using several datasets and the resulting classification
model can be used to protect different web applications. The
main advantage is that it is easy to deploy and capable of
adapting to changes in the web application.
However, the detection capabilities provided by the one-
class approach do not adapt so well to prevent both zero-
day attacks and attacks that exploit specific vulnerabilities of
a application, in particular those involving suspicious input.
Thus, as a complementary solution, we have experimented
with techniques that use high-order n-grams up to some n to
provide anomaly detection capabilities based on the expected
language signature of the input fields of the application. The n-
gram approach requires to have an application specific dataset
with valid request to train its model. By modeling the language
signature of each attribute of the web application it is possible
to recognize known attacks with good precision and also to
detect zero-days attacks.
In summary, if we need to fast deploy a WAF to protect a
web application without having a specific dataset or the web
application changes constantly (e.g. public website powered by
a content manager), we propose to use the one-class approach.
We will call this Scenario I, when we want to protect a web
application without having any specific training data. In this
case we would like to address the following question: Is it
possible to build an attack detection system learning from
training data collected from other web applications? A second
question in this scenario it is related to MODSECURITY: Can
we improve the results of MODSECURITY using machine
learning methods? That is, can we reduce the number of false
positives (FP) generated by MODSECURITY? In the scenario
where we need to protect a business critical web application
where high levels of security are required, and the application’s
changes are controlled, we can deploy the n-gram approach. In
this second scenario, Scenario II, it shall be required to have a
testing phase before each new deployment of the application,
so specific training data will be available. This training data
shall be used to train and update the n-gram model before
the application’s go-live. In this scenario, we would like to
understand the attainable performance of machine learning
methods against that of MODSECURITY.
III. LEARNING MODELS
We now turn to the description of the models proposed for
enhancing the capabilities of MODSECURITY using machine
learning techniques. These models follow a common pattern
that we proceed to describe.
1) Training set.: In web applications information between
the client and the server is exchanged using the HTTP protocol.
This protocol is based in a request/response model using
plain-text (ASCII) messages. The model is built up from
a training set T of normal HTTP requests that have been
previously recorded. The set T is assumed to be representative
of legitimate traffic. An HTTP request is just a string with the
following structure: a request header (specifying the method
to be applied, the URI on which it is applied and the protocol
version), a collection of header fields of the form field=value
and possibly a request body.
2) Pre-processing: When non-ASCII information has to be
exchanged between the client and the server the same encoding
has to be employed. Different types of encoding might be used
(e.g. URL encode [6]). Before building the statistical model,
the requests are first pre-processed to decode the information
they contain. This might also involve parsing part of the HTTP
request structure or removing parts of it that are considered
useless for the model. How granular is the parsing processing
of the request structure constitutes a first choice in the model
design.
3) Feature extraction: Then, a collection of features are
extracted from the request. These features are related to the
occurrences of a collection A of substrings or TOKENS in
the request. The criteria used to select these tokens is a
second design choice of the model. We experimented with
two different criteria: i) using a fixed collection of words
determined by a security expert from the current state of
the art in web attacks, and ii) automatically computing them
from the training set (n-grams) . This gives rise to an internal
representation of the requests in terms of the numbers resulting
from this counting. Such representation can be conceived as a
vector of numbers, where each position of the vector contains
the number associated to a given token, or more generally, as
a mapping associating numbers to tokens (bag of words).
4) Model computation: The model is a probabilistic distri-
bution for the elements of the internal representation estimated
4from those computed for the requests in the training set T .
The algorithm to be used for computing this distribution
is a third choice to be made in the model design. This
distribution provides the signature of the web application,
which characterizes the normal HTTP requests exchanged with
the application. From a geometrical perspective, the model
can also be conceived as a hyper-volume containing all the
points (vectors) corresponding to the internal representation
of a normal HTTP request.
5) Request classification: The WAF uses a model M to
analyze incoming HTTP requests on-line, one by one, as they
are received, and classify them into two classes: normal and
abnormal requests. Abnormal requests are supposed to be an
attack, and hence processed differently according to the WAF
policy (logged, filtered, etc). In order to test a given HTTP
request r, the WAF computes the internal representation of r.
Then, a score sr = dist(r,M) is computed for the request, us-
ing a distance function dist which measures how far the actual
signature of r is from the expected signature provided by the
model M . A score of 0 means that the HTTP request contents
completely matches the expected signature. The higher the
score, the less the field contents meets the expected frequency
distribution. Another design choices are the distance and the
criterion C (M, r) to be used for deciding whether the distance
to the signature characterizing the application is far enough to
deem the request r as anomalous. Usually, this criterion relies
on the distribution of distances that can be drawn from the
training set T , by computing the score of each individual
training request.
The rest of this section is devoted to describe how the
general pattern just described has been instantiated into two
different models: one-class classification and n-gram analysis.
A. One-Class Classification
One-class classification [7] assumes that training informa-
tion is only available for one of the classes; in our case the
class of valid requests, this is also called novelty detection[8].
Hence, the problem of one-class classification is to learn the
behavior of valid requests and identify attacks as deviations
from the learned behavior for the valid class. That is, the goal
is to define a boundary around the valid class maximizing the
number of valid requests inside the boundary and minimizing
the number of non valid instances inside it. Valid instances
that fall outside of the defined boundary are false positives of
the classifier.
To build such a classifier we must define the features that
are supposed to capture the properties of common known web
application attacks (e.g. SQLINJECTION, XSS, among others).
We shall rely on the the experience of a security expert to do
that. In III-A2 we describe the features that will be used to
characterize the request.
1) Pre-processing: In this phase, besides performing de-
codification, we also filter the request headers that are used
to exchange contextual information between the user-agent
and the server. All information contained in headers that are
specific to the protocol, such as cookies, proxies and IP, which
do not represent user behavior and should not be considered
to infer application behavior, are filtered out.
Table I
SELECTED SPECIAL WORDS BY THE SECURITY SPECIALIST
< ../ alert exec password
<> ’ alter from path/child
<!– “ and href script
= ( bash_history #include select
> ) between insert shell
| $ /c into table
|| * cmd javascript: union
- */ cn= mail= upper
–> & commit objectclass url=
; + count onmouseover User-Agent:
: %00 -craw or where
/ %0a document.cookie order winnt
/* Accept: etc/passwd passwd
2) Feature Computation: Several known attacks make use
of specially crafted inputs to force the server behave in a
non expected manner. Most of these inputs use as part of the
attack special characters, like for instance . , ; < >, or special
substrings like for instance select, alert, passwd. We propose
to use these special characters and substrings to capture the
characteristics of the request. This is basically a bag-of-words
model where each document (in our case each request) is
represented as a bag of its words (the special characters and
substrings mentioned above). The bag-of-words feature vectors
are calculated counting the appearance of each word in the
request. In this way, each request r is represented with a vector
xr where each element in this vector counts the number of
times each word is observed in r. To select the set of words, we
studied valid and attack requests, and applied the knowledge
of a security expert. In Table I we list all the words used. Since
we are modeling the valid class, we expect that few of those
words will be present in each request. As we are focused on
user input, we analyze the query string of the URL, the request
body and the requests headers, all information that could be
modified by the user of the application.
3) Model computation: The idea is to detect attacks as
deviations from normality using a one-class classifier; a re-
quest will be classified as an attack if it is far from the
observed valid class. A well known method to build a one-
class classifier is to estimate the probability density function
(pdf) of the training data and to estimate a threshold to segment
normal and abnormal instances. Among the existing methods
to estimate the probability density function, Gaussian Mixture
Models (GMM) is one of the most common one. If x is a
feature vector, it is assumed to be an observation of a random
variable X with a pdf:
p(x) =
n∑
k=1
PiN (x;µk,Σk), (1)
where n is the number of gaussians, Pk, µk and Σk the weight,
mean vector and covariance matrix of component k respec-
tively and N a Gaussian pdf. The Expectation Maximization
(EM) algorithm [9] can be used to estimate the parameters
of the GMM (mean vector µk, covariance matrices Σk and
weights Pk). In our case, each component of the obtained
GMM constitutes a cluster that captures the distribution of
valid requests. We also use EM to estimate n, the number of
components (clusters).
5Once we have the GMM of valid class, in order to classify
an instance into valid or attack, we need to compute the
distance to each component of the GMM (cluster) and apply
a threshold on this distance.
In this work we use the Mahalanobis distance since it
measures the distance of a feature vector to a distribution.
In this case, the distribution corresponds to a component of
the GMM (Ck), so the distance is defined as:
dist(xi,Ck) =
√
(xi − µk)Σ−1k (xi − µk) (2)
If xi correspond to the mean of the distribution then the
distance is 0, and increases when the point moves away
taking into account the standard deviation of the distribution.
If one of the dimensions has a standard deviation of 0 in the
distribution, the Mahalanobis distance could not be calculated.
For this reason, we adjust the covariance matrix by adding a
regularization term to it ∗ Id, where  is the smallest standard
deviation in diag(Σi) different from 0 and Id is the identity
matrix. Intuitively this regularization allows the observation of
new values on requests not seen in T .
4) Request Classification: In this approach, the score sr is
a vector where each position corresponds to the dist(r,Ck).
Before being able to do request classification, we need to
estimate the threshold of each cluster. The threshold of the
cluster is defined by analyzing the distribution of the distances
of each instance of T that where assigned to the cluster. This
transforms the multi-dimensional space of features into a real
number corresponding to the distance of the request to the
the cluster. Given that all requests assigned to a cluster (as a
result of using EM) can be represented by a component of the
GMM, we approximate the distribution of teh distances with
a normal distribution. We define distk to denote the mean of
all distance of xi to Ck where xi ∈ Ck and stdk to denote the
standard deviation of the distances of xi ∈ Ck. Finally, the
threshold tCk is defined as follows:
tCk = λ[distk + 10 ∗ stdk], λ ∈ (0, 1] (3)
The use of dist and std makes it possible to have in
the model a specific threshold for each cluster that depends
directly on how the instances that belong to that cluster behave.
The constant factor 10 was derived using different dataset in
a way that when λ = 1 the distance for all xi ∈ Ck is
less than tCk . Varying the threshold, by multiplying it by a
constant λ, let us change the model’s precision. Even if there
exists a specific threshold for each cluster, the λ constant is
the same for all clusters. This allows us to have only one
parameter to control the precision of the whole model. As λ
grows more valid requests fall into the clusters, but also more
attacks. When λ decreases, the false positive rates increase,
but more attacks are missed. This parameter allows us to have
different operational points.
Before deploying this approach to protect a web application,
we need to define which operational point to use. The best
scenario corresponds to have a labeled dataset with valid
requests and attacks. In this scenario is possible to adjust this
threshold to its best operational point. In real life applications,
our best scenario is having examples of only normal behavior.
In this case, one metric to define the operational point could
be the amount of false positives that we are willing to accept.
The worst scenario is when we do not have even an application
specific dataset. For these scenario, we propose to use as
training dataset a mixture of several datasets from different
web applications. In Section IV we will present the results
of this approach (Scenario I) to show that good performance
scores can be achieved.
After training the model, the classification of a new re-
quest r starts by calculating the score sr. This results in a
vector where each position corresponds to the Mahalanobis
distance of r to Ck. The criterion C (M, r) for this approach
corresponds to compare the score sr with the corresponding
threshold for each cluster. If any of the scores is lower than
the threshold the request is classified as normal, otherwise is
classified as an attack.
B. Anomaly detection using n-grams
We now turn to present our second approach, which pos-
itively characterizes the normal behavior of each application
using n-grams as tokens.
A well-known technique for identifying the language of
a piece of text is to measure the frequency of the n-grams
occurring in the text. An n-gram is a sequence of n (usually
consecutive) symbols of the alphabet used in the text (for
example, ASCII characters, words, etc.). For instance, the most
frequent character trigrams in Spanish are del and que. On the
other hand, the character trigrams whe and ike are very rare in
Spanish, but not in an SQL sentence used for an SQL-injection
attack, as they appear in the keywords WHERE and LIKE. In
the most general case, the n-gram may be a sequence of words
instead of characters (in which case we may consider the
symbols to be the words, and the rest of the analysis remains
the same).
1) Pre-processing: The collection of all the n-grams ocur-
ring in a text can be computed following a very simple,
fast and linear algorithm, in which a window of size n is
slided all along the text. This algorithm may be preceeded
by a tokenization procedure, in which the text is chunked
into words, separed by a set of delimiters. A delimiter is any
sequence of symbols matching a given regular expression.
In the case of an URI, for example, the slash symbol (/)
and the ampersand symbol (&) are natural delimiters of an
URI, and the n-grams are sequences of strings, each one
describing either the domain of the web site or a resource
in its ressource hierachy. For those languages where there are
no clear delimiters in the text, words are just the alphabet
symbols themselves. Identifying word with symbols provides
a tokenization procedure that can be applied in any case,
as it is independent from the language grammar. This is an
important advantage, as the same method can be uniformelly
applied to all fields. Moreover, in practice web applications
frequently make use of custom HTTP fields, and their structure
is unknown.
Not all n-grams are equally relevant. Actually, some distinc-
tions may be more problematic than helpful. For example, IP
address 168.192.0.1 does not better characterize valid requests
6than IP 168.192.0.2. On the other hand, making the model
to be dependent on the occurrence of particular IP addresses
is more prone to overfitting with respect to the training set
T . For this reason, we count the n-grams obtained after
applying some abstraction function abs : Sm → Sk on them
for some k ≤ m, where S is the ASCII alphabet. In our
experimental results we use an abstraction function performing
the following transformations on the decoded HTTP request:
(a) letters are uncapitalized, (b) accents are removed and (c)
digits are replaced by the capital letter “N”.
Opposite to the previous approach, in this case the pre-
processing step tries to exploit as much as it can from the
HTTP structure. Even if the HTTP protocol does not impose
any structure on the request body, most of the interaction
with the user consists in presenting HTML forms to be filled.
Once filled, HTML forms are transmitted to the server as a
list of parameter assignments y1 = v1 & . . . yk = vk usually
separated by the & symbol. Therefore, the request body may
be either plain text or a parameter assignment. In this latter
case, we do not work directly on the request string itself as
in the one-class approach: we first parse its structure, keeping
the HTTP field and parameter contents, and discarding their
names. We use the term model fields to design either a header
field, or a web application parameter. The model computes a
separate signature for each model field.
In the sequel, we introduce a general framework for exper-
imenting with attack detection based on n-gram frequencies.
We consider n-grams of length m formed from symbols from
the alphabet S, for all m ≤ n, where n is a model parameter
that can be adjusted for each application.
2) Feature extraction: Formally, a model field is a pair
formed by an HTTP request field name and either a parameter
name yi (parameter assignment), or a special value ⊥, oth-
erwise (for representing unestructured, plain text body). The
basic attributes of the model are the n-grams that can be found
in the model fields contents. Each attribute is a pair (x, z) ∈ A
formed with a model field x and an n-gram z ∈ Sm ocurring
in x. In the sequel, we use the notation x.z for this pair. The
model is enriched with an additional attribute not related to
n-grams, namely, the number of characters (length) of each
model field x. This additional attribute is also a good indicator
for code injection attacks, as they are likely to increase the
expected field length.
We associate a random variable Xa to each attribute a =
(x, z) ∈ A, which measures events related to the occurrences
of the n-gram z in the model field x. We focus on two types
of events: the number of occurrences of the n-gram in the
model field (integer value) or its frequency inside the field
contents, that is, the number of occurrences of the n-gram
divided into the total amount of n-grams occurring in this
model field (real value). Measuring the number of n-grams is
better suited for those model fields having an enumerated type
of possible values, for example, the languages that the web
application support. Measuring the n-gram frequency performs
better when the field length may significantly vary from one
request to another. For example, a message field in a contact
form of the web application contains free text that may be
arbitrarily long. The number of occurrences of a given symbol
may be quite different depending on the message, but the
frequency of that symbol should be rather the same in all
messages.
A distribution for one of these random variables Xa is a
characterized by a tuple d = (µ, σ,max,min,Nd, Hd) ∈ D ,
where µ is the distribution mean, σ2 the distribution variance,
max,min ∈ N the maximum and minimum values that were
sampled for Xa, and Nd ∈ N the number of sampled values.
Hd : R→ N is the histogram counting the number of requests
in T having a given frequency for a.
3) Model computation: We assume that each random vari-
able Xa is independent from the other random variables. This
means that constructing the probabilistic distribution of the
internal representation of the HTTP requests amounts to con-
struct one independent distribution for each attribute a ∈ A .
The distribution parameters of each random variable Xa are
incrementally approximated using Welford’s algorithm for on-
line computation of its mean and variance [10]. Therefore,
the result of this iterative process is a map M : A → D
representing the learned distribution of the random variable
Xa associated to each attribute a. This mapping provides the
language signature of each model field x, in terms of the
probability distribution of the n-grams in the specific language
of x. We compute a specific language for each field. This is
an important difference with respect to other works [11, 12],
which analyze the traffic at lower (TCP) layers: while each
field represents a logical unit of the web application, with its
own specific laguage (numbers, addresses, names, credit card
numbers, etc.), this structure is splitted and mixed at the TCP
layer into one single language (the union of all these specific
languages).
4) Request classification: In order to test a given HTTP
request r, the WAF computes the map fr : A → R of concrete
values for each attribute of r. Then, each model field x of r
is considered. If field x is not defined in model M , then r is
rejected. This amounts to say that any request containing un-
known HTTP fields or web application parameters that have not
been met during the training phase is deemed as anomalous.
Otherwise, the score sr.x =
∑
i=1..n dist
x
i (r,M) is computed
for field x, using a function distxi . The definition of the distance
depends on the n-gram length. Also, different distances could
be associated to different fields. If there is a field x for which
the obtained score does not satisfy some given criterion C , the
whole request is considered valid, otherwise it is deemed as
anomalous (outlier value). The criterion used for determining
whether the distance is acceptable is that the score falls inside
the rank defined by the minimum and maximum values of the
score distribution ds associated to the requests in the training
set T , that is, C (ds, sr) = ds.min ≤ sr ≤ ds.max. This
distribution is drawn from the training set T , by computing
the score of each individual training request.
The distance from the request signature to the language
signature is measured using Mahalanobis distance under the
assumption of independence of the random variables associ-
ated to the tokens:
distxi (r,M) =
√√√√∑
z∈T xi
|µM (x.z)− fr(x.z)|2
1
|T xi | + σ
2
M (x.z)
(4)
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away the request signature is from the language signature. As
a consequence, differences for n-grams with highly variable
frequencies do not weight as much as differences for n-grams
with a rather constant frequency. The constant 1|T xi | is added
to the denominator to prevent a division by zero for those n-
grams with constant frequency. Note that the larger the number
of samples for x’s i-grams is, the greater the difference from
the mean weights in the total score.
In practice, the training set T is a small fragment of all
possible HTTP requests that the web application accepts, so
a given n-gram of the test request r may not be present
in T , but still be a valid input for the web application.
This is problematic, as unknown n-grams are assigned the
highest possible anomalyness score. However, most of the
fields contain values that are a subset of some larger language.
For instance, a form field in the web application corresponding
to an address in Madrid is a particular case of a piece of text
written in Spanish. Such larger language has its own language
signature Px, which can be used as a prior distribution for
the field x. By assigning priors to some fields we decrease the
false positive rates: should a given n-gram not be defined in
M for that field, we use that prior as the expected distribution
for the attribute. Notice that this approach is possible when the
analysis is performed at the HTTP level, when the application
fields can be recognized, but is much harder to implement
at the lower communication levels. If the n-gram is neither
defined in this prior, then we assign the singleton distribution
d such that µ = σ = 0 = min = max = 0, Nd =| T x.zi | and
Hd = 0 →| T x.zi |, which represents that 0 is the expected
frequency for this n-gram according to the training sample T .
In some situations, it may be helpfull to deliberately exclude
some fields from the model. For example some web applica-
tions generate a dynamic URI or encode dynamic information
as part of the URI itself. Those URI have almost no chance of
being met during the model training, and therefore are prone to
generate false positives. In such cases, excluding the URI from
the analysis improves its performance. Another example that
can be excluded are those fields which are supposed to be close
to random data, such as a parameter transmitting a passowrd
or encrypted data. In our implementation, a configuration file
enable to assign the model parameters to be used in the
model construction, such as the n-gram length bound n,the
tokenization method and its delimiter, the distance, the model
fields to be excluded from the analisis, etc. Independent values
can be assigned for these parameters for each model field.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have evaluated the proposed models experimenting
with three datasets. We have privileged the use of public
datasets which are intended to be used for analyzing web
application attacks. Unfortunately, there exist very few datasets
of HTTP traffic in general, and even fewer with tagged attacks.
The only public datasets that seemed useful for our purpose
were the CSIC2010 dataset [13] and the dataset from the
ECML/PKDD2007 challenge [14]. We discarded the use of the
DARPA 1999 dataset, as it contains TCP traffic and is no longer
representative of the state of the art in nowadays attacks [15].
We also evaluated the models on a dataset of our own which
was obtained from the HTTP traffic to the web server of a
University. We will refer to this dataset as DRUPAL.
Each of the used datasets is made of a collection of complete
HTTP requests (header and body) which have been partitioned
into one training dataset and two testing ones: one for valid
traffic and another for anomalous one. In Table II, we present
the details of each dataset. As explained before, our models
only use normal traffic for training, labeled attacks will be con-
sidered only for evaluation purposes. The model performance
was measured with the usual true positive rate (TPR) and true
negative rate (TNR) indicators. The TPR corresponds to the
percentage of anomalous requests that are detected as attacks.
The TNR corresponds to the percentage of valid request that
are spotted as normal traffic. The results are presented as ROC
curves that describe how these two indicators are affected by
the parameters of the models.
The baseline to which we compare the behavior of our
models are the TPR and TNR values obtained as the outcome
of using MODSECURITY configured with the OWASP CRS
version 2.2.9 out of the box.
In the one-class classification approach the main parameter
of the classifier is the threshold that governs the size of the
clusters. The size is adjusted by a parameter λ whose values
range from 0 to 1 (see equation 3). Each value of λ determines
an operational point of the classifier. For each dataset we shall
present: i) the ROC curve obtained for the one-class classifier
when training is performed using specific data for the web
application and varying λ in (0, 1] (blue curve). This ROC
curve can be seen as the ideal result for the classifier since uses
an application specific training dataset, ii) the ROC produced
with the one-class classifier trained with data from other web
applications will be plotted as a green thicker curve. This
result addresses the main question in Scenario I. The black
diamond over the green curve indicates a default operational
point obtained with λ = 0.5. This point was fixed based on
the number of FP for the training set. Since in the Scenario
I we do not have specific training data we cannot fine tune
the operational point, iii) the result of MODSECURITY using
the OWASP CRS out of the box is indicated with a blue square,
iv) the yellow ball, which shows the performance of the model
that combines one-class with MODSECURITY following the
combination strategy discussed in Section II-C
In the n-gram model approach a fine tuning of the model
was experimented, assigning different tokenization methods,
distances, prior distributions and n-gram length bounds to
each model field. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict
the presentation of the results for the n-gram length bounds
n = 1 . . . 5 when an optimized configuration is assigned to the
other model parameters.
A. CSIC2010 dataset
In year 2010 the Spanish Research National Council (CSIC)
developed and made available a dataset to test a system to pro-
tect web applications [13]. This dataset embodies a collection
of normal and abnormal HTTP requests for a web application
8Figure 1. Results for the CSIC2010 dataset. Blue square: MODSECURITY with OWASP CRS out of the box. Blue solid curve: one-class varying λ (OC).
Green thicker solid curve: one-class varying λ - training with mixed dataset. Black diamond: operational point for OC. Yellow circle: OC operational point
combined with MODSECURITY.
Table II
DATASETS COMPOSITION
Train (Valid) Test (Valid) Test (Attack)
ECML/PKDD 24504 10502 15110
CSIC 36000 36000 25065
Own Dataset 45907 19675 1287
that provides functionalities to perform on-line shopping on a
tiny store. The dataset is made of 36.000 valid requests for the
training set, another 36.000 different valid requests for testing
normal behavior, and 25.000 abnormal test requests mixing
attacks with valid requests containing infrequent characters
in the parameter fields (typos). Unfortunately, the distribution
between attacks and infrequent values is not specified. The
attacks were generated using tools such as Paros (which
later became OWASP ZED [16]) and w3af [17], and include
SQL injection, buffer overflow, information gathering, files
disclosure, CRLF injection, XSS, server side include, parameter
tampering, among others. Another important characteristic is
that it was conceived and intended for this kind of experiment:
the HTTP requests have a few fields which always take a
limited collection of values. It contains several duplicated
cases, as each GET request in the dataset containing a query
in the URI is followed by an equivalent POST request, with the
same query in the body field. The attacks are concentrated on
the web application parameters.
In Figure 1 we present the results in terms of TPR and
TNR for the CSIC2010 dataset. The simplicity of the normal
requests and the mixture of attack with just anomalous traffic
is observed in the high TNR and the low TPR obtained by
MODSECURITY (blue square). As can be noticed, the one-
class classifier trained with data from other web applications
(green curve), used to evaluate Scenario I, produced good
performance scores (TNR and TPR). The ROC curve shows
that there are several points that outperform MODSECURITY
(blue square). Furthermore, if we compare the results obtained
using an application specific training set (blue curve), we can
see the performance it is not far from the ideal one (when
we train the one-class classifier with data from the same web
application). Finally, the yellow ball shows the performance
of the model that combines one-class with MODSECURITY.
The combination improves in terms of TNR but decreases
in TPR. This is because our main objective is to decrease
MODSECURITY false positives so the combination algorithm
only mark a request to be an attack if both experts tag it as
an attack. This means that some requests that were tagged as
an attack by the one-class model where tagged as valid by
MODSECURITY and viceversa.
If we compare the results with our baseline, e.g. for the same
TNR, MODSECURITY detects around 34% of attacks, where
the one-class approach detects around 56%. In this particular
dataset, the integration of MODSECURITY rules with the one-
class approach does not improve the results of one-class by
itself in terms of TPR but clearly reduces the number of false
positives (i.e., TNR close to 1). See Table III for details on
the results.
For the n-gram analysis, we configured our tool to perform
some specific behaviors for some of the model fields. Despite
the default n-gram length, the analysis is always bounded
to monogram analysis for URL, login identifier, customer’s
national identifier and passwords. This is because the only
biased aspect of those fields is the set of allowed characters,
but almost any combination of them is possible in principle,
so higher order n-gram analysis is prone to produce false
positives. In the case of the URI, the slash bar character (/)
is specified as delimiter, and monogram analysis is performed
on the number of resulting words that occur in the field,
not its frequency. The reason is that is quite unlikely that
one of these words (which represent resource folders in the
web application directory) appears more than twice in the
URI. Finally, following the technique explained in section
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TRUE NEGATIVE AND TRUE POSITIVE RATES (IN %) FOR EACH DATASET
CSIC2010 DRUPAL ECML/PKDD2007
Method TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR
ModSecurity 76,1 34,3 61,1 72,2 42,8 93,0
One-class: λ = 0, 5 88,9 34,6 93,3 86,2 0,0 98,6
Combined OC-MS 97,3 20,1 99,1 63,0 42,8 92,1
N-grams
n=1 99,9 93,0 93,9 95,9
n=2 99,9 94,8 94,4 97,6
n=3 99,5 96,1 92,0 97,5
n=4 96,2 96,8 90,7 98,8
n=5 90,9 97,5 89,4 98,9
III-B, we specified a prior n-gram distribution for the fields
corresponding to names, cities and addresses, drawn from a
collection of Wikipedia articles written in Spanish. The use
of priors for these fields reduced the false positive rate in 3%
for trigrams. The most significant impact on false positives is
observed for bigrams and trigrams.
B. ECML/PKDD2007 dataset
In year 2007 the 18th European Conference on Machine
Learning (ECML) and the 11th European Conference on
Principles and Practice of Knowledge Discovery in Databases
(PKDD), put forward a challenge on Analyzing Web Traffic
[14]. The challenge objective was to construct an algorithm
based on machine learning techniques to perform multi-class,
contextual classification and attack pattern isolation. As part
of the challenge it was provided a dataset which contained
requests classified in seven different types of attacks plus valid
requests. The dataset is composed of 35.006 requests classified
as normal and 15.110 requests classified as attacks.
After analyzing the dataset we infer that some process
of obfuscation/anonymization was executed on the dataset to
protect urls, parameter names and values. Those items were
replaced by random values and the obfuscations process does
not seem to be an injective function, as no URI, parameter
name or value appears twice in the dataset. As a consequence,
the ECML/PKDD2007 dataset revealed useless for carrying on
n-gram analysis experiments, as the valid behavior that could
be used for training purposes consists in random data with
no bias. On the other side, the one-class approach can be
successfully used to detect attack signatures. Figure 2 shows
the result of this experiment. Regarding the Scenario I (green
curve), the performance evaluated with TNR and TPR is not
as good as in the case of CSIC2010 and DRUPAL dataset that
will be presented below. After careful evaluation, we observed
that when the process of obfuscation is executed in the dataset
the random values were generated using letters, numbers and
the = and − symbols. These two last symbols are included in
our list of tokens defined by the expert. After analyzing the
problem, we found that this artificial way of generating the
values are so specific and different from the normal traffic to
the web application, that the generic approach did not work
as expected. On the other hand, if we compare the results
obtained using a model trained with specific requests (blue
curve), we observe that good performance is achieved. In the
curve there are some points with less FP than ModSecurity but
slightly worse performance when considering TPR. We believe
that the way this dataset was generated strongly conditions the
results. Better results should be obtained if we removed the
features mentioned above.
C. DRUPAL dataset
The CSIC2010 and ECML/PKDD2007 datasets have been
artificially conceived for the sake of experimenting with ma-
chine learning techniques. In order to evaluate our approach on
real life applications, based on actual requests and attacks, we
crafted a dataset by registering three days of incoming traffic to
the public website of a University 1. The only post-processing
of this dataset consisted in blurring password values in the
request.
Since the requests are from real traffic, this dataset is less
balanced: it has 65582 valid request and 1287 real attacks. It
also contains an important amount of custom HTTP fields used
by the applications hosted in the web site.
The approach of registering traffic in order to exploit it as a
dataset has been already used in several previous works. One
of the difficulties that raises is classifying the received requests
into valid ones and attacks, so that the dataset can be separated
into training and a testing part. The web site of the University
is protected by an instance of MODSECURITY featuring the
OWASP CRS, which has been tuned for several years by a
team of security and infrastructure experts. We therefore used
MODSECURITY as the labeling tool: those registered requests
that were accepted by MODSECURITY were considered as the
valid traffic and used for the training step and for the testing
dataset, while those requests that MODSECURITY rejected
were used as the testing dataset for the attacks.
Figure 3 describes the results for the DRUPAL dataset.
We observe that they are similar to the ones obtained for
CSIC2010. The one-class classifier trained with data from
other web applications (green curve), used to evaluate Sce-
nario I, is very close to the blue curve which is the ROC
generated with the one-class classifier trained with application
specific data. The default operational point, black diamond,
outperforms MODSECURITY, and several of the points in the
previous curves clearly perform better than MODSECURITY.
Finally, the results of the model that combines one-class and
MODSECURITY (yellow ball) improves in terms of TNR but
decreases in TPR. This is because our main objective is to
decrease MODSECURITY FP so the combination algorithm
only marks a request to be an attack if both experts tag
it as an attack. This mean that some request that where
tagged as an attack by the one-class where tagged as valid
by MODSECURITY and viceversa.
D. Discussion
Based on the results for the three datasets and the two
proposed approaches we discuss in what follows the main
questions presented in Section II-C.
1The dataset is not public, but it is available on demand to other researchers
willing to reproduce our results or comparing them against other ones, by
writing to the authors
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Figure 2. Results for the ECML/PKDD2007 dataset. Blue square: MODSECURITY with OWASP CRS out of the box. Blue solid curve: one-class varying λ
(OC). Green thicker solid curve: one-class varying λ - training with mixed dataset. Black diamond: operational point for OC. Yellow circle: OC operational
point combined with MODSECURITY.
Figure 3. Results for the DRUPAL dataset. Blue square: MODSECURITY with OWASP CRS out of the box. Blue solid curve: one-class varying λ (OC). Green
thicker solid curve: one-class varying λ - training with mixed dataset. Black diamond: operational point for OC. Yellow circle: OC operational point combined
with MODSECURITY.
a) Scenario I: Is it possible to build an attack detection
system learning from training data collected from other web
applications?: The results for datasets CSIC2010 and DRUPAL
present evidence that it is possible to build a one-class clas-
sifier using generic training data, that is, using a dataset with
request not from the web application to protect. Furthermore,
the degradation with respect to the same classifier trained with
specific data for the web application is not critical. For the
case of the ECML/PKDD2007 dataset we already discussed the
particularities which justify the differences between the one-
class classifier trained with specific and non specific training
data.
b) Scenario I: Can we improve the results of ModSecurity
using machine learning methods?: Looking at the results
for the datasets CSIC2010 and DRUPAL we can conclude
that it is possible to improve the results of MODSECURITY.
For the ECML/PKDD2007 dataset the results of the method
that combines MODSECURITY and one-class are the same as
MODSECURITY. One advantage of one-class is that we have
several operational points to choose from. In particular, we can
reduce the number of FP (increasing TNR) but reducing TPR.
As mentioned above, the particularities of the dataset prevent
taking advantage of the one-class classifier trained with generic
data. For future work we plan to analyze this issue in detail.
c) Scenario II: Attainable performance of machine learn-
ing methods against ModSecurity: Based on the obtained
results we can draw the following conclusions. First, based on
the results of one-class and n-grams, it is possible to improve
the results of MODSECURITY using machine learning. Second,
looking at the TNR and TPR scores computed for the n-
gram method, we can say that the n-gram approach is a good
solution if we have an application specific dataset to train its
model.
V. RELATED WORK
There exist in the literature several previous works con-
cerned with the application of machine learning techniques to
detect information systems attacks.
A. Virtual patching
Web applications are designed using three major tiers: a
thin client (web browser), the business logic and a datastore.
Virtual patching may be applied to any of those tiers. In recent
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years work has been reported [18, 19, 20] concerning the
use of database firewalls (DBF) as remediation tools. In all of
these works anomaly detection techniques have been applied
to analyze the flow of SQL sentences from the business logic
tier of the application to the database with the objective of
detecting (only) SQL injection attacks. As a DBF can only
inspect the traffic between the business logic and the database
server it is not capable of detecting attacks that are not directed
to the data layer of the application.
There exists several proprietary implementations of WAF
technology. They have been reviewed and ranked in a recent
report of the Garner Magic Quadrant [21], where, in particular,
one can find the following statement concerning the reviewed
technology: "Use of machine learning is rare and often still
unproven".
B. Application layer analysis
One of the seminal works in anomaly detection techniques
was developed by Wang and Stolfo [11], where they intro-
duced PAYL, a payload-based anomaly detector for intrusion
detection. Their approach consists in comparing the byte
frequency distribution in network packets using (a simplified)
Mahalanobis distance. Accordingly with the current attack
vectors of that time, their objective was focused on protecting
an internal network from packets carrying worms or other
forms of malware. Consistently, their model works on TCP
packets, that is, on the network OSI layer. As the byte
distribution heavily depends on the application protocol, they
divide the stream into smaller groups of packets, grouping
them by destination port and by payload length. They applied
PAYL to the traffic to port 80 (HTTP) of the 1991 DARPA IDS
dataset, obtaining excellent detection results. However, their
results relate to the attack vectors of 1999. Indeed, Ingham
and Inoue report in [15] that the DARPA IDS 99 dataset only
contain four web attacks. Moreover, it does not contain any
of the OWASP TOP 10 attacks [22]2. As a consequence, while
[11] reports on a 100% detection rate for traffic on port 80 of
the DARPA IDS dataset based on byte frequency distribution
of the unparsed TCP payloads, performing the same analysis
on the CISC2010 dataset yielded a detection rate of only
40% of the true anomalous cases. This low performance has
been also independently reported by Ingham and Inoue in
[15]. The reason is that token distribution varies from one
HTTP field or web application parameter to another, which are
spread along several TCP packets. Protecting web applications
requires shifting the analysis to the application OSI layer,
focusing on HTTP requests.
C. Machine learning techniques
a) Training from normal traffic only: In the
ECML/PKDD2007 challenge [14], the objective was to
classify web application requests using a multi-class
approach, in which the training dataset contains labeled
HTTP requests which were classified into normal ones and
2This is not surprising, as web applications arose during the 2000, and SQL
injection was first reported in December 1998 [23]
attacks. Several solutions were presented [24, 25, 26]. In
particular, Gallagher et al [26] presented a solution that used
classical techniques of information retrieval. Even if their
solution performs quite well it is restricted to detect only
known attacks and relies on a labeled dataset which contains
dozens of thousands of requests. In our case, our solutions
only require a training dataset that contains normal traffic. In
addition to this, we have shown that the one-class approach
works quite well even in the absence of a dataset proper
of the application being protected. The scenario in which
the WAF is trained with a dataset containing requests from
applications other than the one being protected our results
outperform MODSECURITY with the OWASP CRS out of the
box. In [27], Raïssi et al conclude, based on the results of the
ECML/PKDD2007 challenge and a feedback survey written
by the challengers, that using machine learning techniques to
detect web application attacks requires to involve the security
experts earlier in the knowledge discovery process. In the
one-class approach we have pursued, the feature selection
phase uses the knowledge of the security expert to identify
the tokens to be considered in the model construction.
b) One-class classification: This approach models the
normal behavior of the application by learning patterns from
positive instances. When a new instance arrives, this instance
is classified by the model resulting in a score. This score, that
is not necessary a probabilistic one, is compared to a threshold
to determine whether this new request belongs to the model.
This approach, which could also be called Anomaly, Outlier
and Normality detection, as far as we know has never been
applied to web application protection before.
c) Analyzing the whole HTTP request: In [28], Kruegel
and Vigna propose an anomaly detection approach where
the attributes of the model capture information about the
parameters of the URI. They focus on characteristics like the
parameter length, the order in which they appear and even
generate a probabilistic grammar for each parameter. In both
of our approaches we analyze the hole request information and
not only the URI parameters. We think this provides further
guarantees because all fields are subject to malformed input
attacks, as illustrated in the ECML/PKDD2007 dataset [25].
d) Token abstraction: Several authors do not directly
work on the tokens themselves, but rather on some simpli-
fication of them. In [29], Corona et al. abstract away numbers
and alphanumeric sequences, representing each category with
a single symbol. Torrano, Perez and Marañón [30] present
an anomaly detection technique where instead of using the
tokens themselves, they use a simplification that only considers
the frequencies of three sets of symbols: characters, numbers
and special symbol, as well as the list of special symbols
used in each field. In general, what is counted is the number
of symbols after applying some forget functor on the set of
tokens, which abstracts away irrelevant differences. Removing
information simplifies and speeds up the analysis by reducing
the combinatory of possible tokens. It also reduces the risk of
overfitting. However, if too much information is removed from
the tokens some attacks may become indistinguishable from
correct behavior, so an adequate compromise shall be found.
In our experiments, the forget functor performs the following
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transformations: (a) letters are transformed into lowercase
and (b) accents are removed (for instance, the letter á is
transformed into a). In addition to this, in the n-gram approach,
digits are replaced by the capital letter “N”. Such transfor-
mations provide a good balance, colapsing all the possible
variants of the select keyword using in SQL injection attacks
(namely, Select, SeLeCt, etc.) but still enabling to differentiate
this keyword from other pieces of natural language text which
may be part of text field in a normal request.
e) N-grams made of words: The contents of each request
field is a string, so most of the anomaly detection approaches
make use of document classification, NLP and information
retrieval techniques. As content languages may significantly
vary from one application to another (and even from one
HTTP field to another), in most of the previous work tokens
are just n-grams [11, 12, 28, 30, 31, 29, 5]. An n-gram is
usually a sequence of consecutive characters, even though
[31] shows that using n characters which are m positions
away one from the other may also be an alternative. We
generalize and extend the idea of n-grams and words in the
following way: the contents string is first split into a sequence
of sub-strings (tokens) separated by other sub-strings meeting
a regular expression (the delimiters). Then, we consider n-
grams formed with sequences of these tokens. This enables
a more accurate analysis of some HTTP fields such as the
URI, where there exists a clear delimiter character (the slash)
which enables to divide the contents into tokens, namely,
the words of the directory resources. Other fields, such as
Accept-Encoding or Accept-Language also make use
of commas and semicolons as delimiters, and can be addressed
in terms of words instead of characters.
f) Fine granularity in the analysis: Among the works
focusing on the application layer, a few of them consider
each HTTP request as a single unstructured document to be
analyzed and classified [26, 14]. This approach is prevalent
when focusing on the current state of the art in attacks, and
is also the approach proposed in the one-class classification
technique presented in this paper. Other works perform some
partial parsing of the HTTP structure, for example in [32, 28].
However, in this latter works, the parsing is reduced to the
structure of the URI, splitting the URI into the URL and
the web application parameters. In our proposal for n-gram
analysis we go further, splitting the request contents into
the contents of its header, header fields, and web application
parameters (either appended to the URI or in the HTTP body).
We advocate for this approach because each field has its own
independent language, which may be quite different from the
language of other fields. As a consequence, a much more
specific and biased contents can be extracted from each one
than from the whole request.
g) Higher order n-grams: Initial attempts for using n-
gram analysis on HTTP requests focused on monograms and
single character distributions [11, 30]. However, Kolesnikov
and Lee [33] and Pastrana et al. [34] have shown that short n-
grams are vulnerable to mimicry attacks, in which the attacker
carefully adds characters in order to get closer to the n-gram
distribution expected by the WAF. Mimicry attacks become
much more challenging when using higher n-grams [12].
Opposite to the cited proposals, we do not use n-grams of
a fixed length n, but all the n-grams of any length up to
a given model parameter n that can be adjusted for each
case. Moreover, in our proposal the n-gram length may be
configured for each field. In this way it is possible to set n = 3
for all the model fields, but restrict the analysis to monograms
on cookies, email addresses or other fields where higher order
n-grams are too sparse but not all symbols are allowed.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
We have presented two complementary approaches to en-
hance the detection capabilities of the MODSECURITY WAF.
We follow a one-class classification approach to learn the
behavior of normal web application requests based on fea-
tures that represent the payload of an attack. Requests with
abnormal behavior are classified as attacks. This classification
process draws its model attributes from the knowledge that
the security experts have concerning the current state of the
art in web application attacks. The values of those attributes
are then trained for nominal cases and learned from the nor-
mal behavior of the application. This classification approach
provides the means for addressing attacks performed on fields
which are expected to contain weakly biased data.
We also put forward an anomaly detection approach based
on the expected n-gram frequencies for the fields and web
parameters of the application. For that we make use of higher
order n-grams of multiple lengths. We have experimented
with several variants of this general framework and described
results obtained with some particular instances of the model
parameters. Anomaly detection draw its attributes from the
expected normal behavior of the application, and deems as an
attack those HTTP requests which deviates from such behavior.
This positive characterization of the normality makes the WAF
more resilient to zero-day attacks.
Experiments have been performed on three datasets of
very different nature. The results on these datasets show the
potential of machine learning approaches in the development
of web application firewalls. The proposed method using a
one-class classifier provide better detection and false positive
rates than MODSECURITY configured with the OWASP CRS
out of the box. Regarding the n-gram approach, we show
that in the two datasets used for testing it, the results clearly
outperform the ones of MODSECURITY. As we said before,
the two approaches can be seen as complementary, the one-
class can be used in Scenario I, when no specific training data
is available, and the n-gram is suitable for Scenario II since it
needs specific training data to learn from normal traffic.
A mid-term goal is to implement a module enabling to
introduce machine learning techniques into ModSecurity itself.
In the meantime, the prototypes implemented for these exper-
iments can be immediately used to shorten the time required
for tuning the Core Rule Set for a particular web application:
running them on ModSecurity’s logs and analyzing those HTTP
requests that are deemed normal by the tools to spots false
positive examples that can be used as basis to tune the rules.
Regarding the combination of one-class and MODSECU-
RITY, in this work we proposed a simple combination based
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on the output labels of both components (normal, attack).
In future work we will study the combination of the scores
provided by both of them. These scores contain more infor-
mation than just the classification outcome. In the area of
classifier combination, there are several alternatives to improve
the classification fusing the scores, or posterior probabilities,
of multiple classification systems.
An alternative approach to address random contents fields is
to apply a symmetry approach to anomaly detection, namely,
use n-grams to learn the language signature of the malicious
payloads for each attack technique in the current state of the
art, and deem as normal the contents of any field that do not
match such signature.
In order to push further the use of machine learning tech-
niques in WAF technology, there is a strong need for disposing
of real, open, free, standardized and documented datasets of
several web application behavior. Such datasets shall offer a
documented description of what web application functionali-
ties are covered in the dataset, and the type of attack payloads
that were used for testing. They shall also include erroneous
or atypical input which does not correspond to attacks, in
order to test the actual TNR that the ML technique offers.
Should an anonymization procedure be required to publish the
dataset, it shall respect the structure and correlation of original
data. These goals can only be achieved by automated tools for
building such datasets for a given application. Providing such
tools is part of our further research agenda.
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